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by Sándor Vida**
Abstract. The article reports on some judgments of the European Court of Human Rights applying the principles 
of the European Convention on Human Rights in respect of trademarks. The first group of cases relates to the 
freedom of expression (Art 10). In the cases Tokaji, Marlboro and McDonald’s, the applicants referred to this 
principle to defend their actions related to the trademark. The second kind of cases relate to the protection of 
property (Protocol No. 1). In the case of Budweiser the European Court took the position in favor of applying this 
rule to a trademark application. The third group of cases relates to the right to a fair trial (Art. 6). According to 
reports on the Orient and McDonald’s cases, the national courts committed important procedural faults. The 
conclusion of the author is that trademark rights can be protected by means of human rights only in exceptional 
circumstances.
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1. INTRODUCTION
It is commonplace that law satisfies social needs. Some social needs were recognised two 
thousand years ago, like protection of property, and others just about two-hundred years 
ago, like trademark protection, and there are some that were recognised just about half a 
century ago, these are e.g. human rights.
The codification of the latter was motivated by the horrors of the Nazi Holocaust 
during World War II as well as by the systematic slaughter of the Armenians during World 
War I, however this motivation can also be conceived as a need to defend citizens against 
the threat from their own nation State.
The first international document in this subject was the “Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights” proclaimed by the United Nations in 1948, which includes the right to life, 
the prohibition from torture and cruelty, inhuman treatment, etc.
Following some similar internationally issued documents, the Council of Europe - 
taking over and completing the content of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 
the U.N. - initiated a Convention including the possibility of judicial sanctions, which was 
signed by the Member States at that time in Rome dated November 4, 1950. Hungary 
similarly to the other former socialist States signed the European Convention on Human 
Rights (hereinafter: Convention) after the regime change.1
Before we go ahead, in order to make a demarcation I consider it useful to note that in 
the following only the Convention and the decisions based on it made by the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR or Court) concerning trademarks will be discussed, 
nevertheless the courts of the USA, South-Africa, Australia2 and other countries also made 
some noteworthy human rights-related decisions in the trademark subject.
      *   The research work of this paper was sponsored by the Fritz-Thyssen Stiftung (Germany).
     **  LL.M Professor of Law. E-mail: vida@danubia.hu
1 Published in Hungary by Act XXXI of 1993.
2 Helfer (2011)
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2. THE CONVENTION AND THE EUROPEAN COURT  
OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Currently 47 European countries are parties to the Convention, including all Member States 
of the European Union.
With respect to the available reference material3 here I would like to note only that 
among the provisions of the Convention the following are especially noteworthy concerning 
trademarks:
– right to fair trial (Art. 6)
– freedom of expression (Art. 10)
– protection of property (Protocol I Art. 1).
Article 19 of the Convention provides for the establishment of the European Court of 
Human Rights and following this (Art. 20-51) for the organisation and procedure of this 
court.4 From the latter provisions, concerning our topic, noteworthy are the provisions of 
the Convention on individual complaints (Art. 34-45). As a result of allowing individual 
complaints and the court practice in connection with it, the ECHR became known 
widespread . Anyway, a complaint may be submitted only in cases where the applicant had 
previously exhausted all domestic remedies. Practically, this means the Supreme Court of 
the applicant’s country.
In case the ECHR considers the individual complaint well-grounded then its decision 
states whether the State complained of had violated the specific article of the Convention, it 
often renders reimbursement of costs in favour of the complainant, moreover, in some cases 
compensation as well. The enforcement of the judgments is monitored by the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe.
At the same time it should be noted that the procedure of the ECHR is not a further 
procedural instance (fourth instance), which is emphasised by several decisions.5
The language of the decisions is English or French. All decisions can be found in the 
online database of the ECHR, however in paper form only a small percentage of them 
(the leading cases) is available, according to my estimation only about 5-10 percent of them.
3. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Historically this provision6 of the Convention goes back to the legislation of the French 
Revolution. Freedom of the press became gradually accepted in 19 century Europe. It is 
3 Rainey (2014); Karpenstein (2012)
4 Grád (2011); Leach (2011)
5 “It is not (the Court’s) function to deal with errors of fact or law allegedly committed by a 
national court, unless and insofar as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the 
Convention” (Garcia Ruiz v. Spain; Reports, 199-I, 589. para 28.).
6 Text of Article 10 (in excerpts): “1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This 
right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without 
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers […]”.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with its duties and responsibilities, may be subject 
to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a 
democratic society, … for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or 
rights of others…”
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memorable that in Hungary Kossuth7 was imprisoned for four years for circumventing 
censorship. In connection with the criminal proceeding against Wesselényi and his company, 
in the Hungarian Parliament in Bratislava at that time Deák8 made several speeches for the 
protection of the freedom of the press.9
Nevertheless, the provisions of the Convention on the freedom of expression are not 
restricted to the freedom of the press, consequently neither are the decisions of the ECHR.
3.1. The Tokaji case
3.1.1. Facts
P. Új, a Hungarian journalist wrote a strongly critical article about the quality of the 
wine Tokaji distributed by Tokaj Kereskedőház in the daily paper Népszabadság dated 
January 2, 2008.
According to the article “[...] the product, a bottle of which is available for less than a 
thousand forint, represents the world’s best wine region, the Hungarian National Pride and 
Treasure [...] and I could cry if I think of it. Not only because of the flavour, although that 
would be enough in itself [...] it is of bad quality, a mishmash of a load of garblings [...] and 
hundreds of thousands of Hungarians drink it with pride, even devotion, the shit, and we are 
fed with it (made to drink it) [...]”
The Tokaj Kereskedőház lodged a criminal complaint against the journalist, and the 
court of Budapest District II-III condemned Új for libel by suspending the penalty for a 
three-year probation. On appeal the case continued at the Metropolitan Court, which 
condemned the journalist for defamation. The second-instance judgment was confirmed by 
the Supreme Court. 
Following this the journalist turned with his complaint to the ECHR.
3.1.2 Judgment10
The ECHR said, referring to its settled case law, that the use of vulgar phrases in itself was 
not decisive as they might serve merely stylistic purposes (judgment para 20), and that 
journalistic freedom also covered possible recourse to a degree of exaggeration, or even 
provocation (judgment para 21).
The Court accepted that in addition to public interest there was a competing interest in 
protecting the commercial success and viability of companies. The State therefore enjoys a 
margin of appreciation as to the means which risk harming its reputation (judgment 
para 22).
The Hungarian courts failed to have regard to the fact that press had a duty to impart 
information and ideas on matters of public interest and in doing so to have possible recourse 
to a degree of exaggeration or even provocation. The expression (shit) used is, regrettably, 
a commonly used one in regard of low-quality wine (judgment para 24).
    7 Attorney at Law, journalist, Governor of Hungary during the war of independence from 
Austria (1848–1849).
    8 Member of Parliament, Minister of Justice (1848), one of the initiators of establishing the 
Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy (1867).
    9 About both of them Koltay (2009) 55 and 59.
10 23954/10 Új v. Hungary 2011. 7. 19; Annual Report 2011, 102.
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The Hungarian courts did not examine the proportionality of criminal-law based 
interference with Article 10 of the Convention (judgment para 25) therefore Article 10 of 
the Convention was violated by them (judgment para 26).
With regard to the above the Court obliged the State of Hungary to pay EUR 3,580 as 
reimbursement of costs and expenses (judgment para 31).
3.1.3. Remarks
The journalist is surely not alone in his feelings to the geographical indication and trademark 
Tokaji. The wine Tokaji is justly famous all over the world. The French king Louis XIV 
declared it to be “the king of wines, the wine of kings” (Le roi des vins, le vin des rois), but 
the great German writer Goethe also wove the commemoration about the wine Tokaji into 
the Faust (in the Auerbach cellar, Leipzig).
It is a matter of fact, when giving their judgments, the domestic courts failed to have 
regard to Article 10 of the Convention as well as to the practice of the Court based thereon. 
Sajó11 states correctly that “in the Hungarian practice, with regard to issues [...] of public 
interest, the interest of freedom of expression did not receive due attention.” Sajó12 is also 
right in saying – of course independently from this case – that the “Hungarian courts pay 
little attention to the impacts made on the freedom of expression if in a discussed case the 
interest of persons is at stake who are in close connection with the government.” Further, in 
my view, the statement of Polgári,13 which is based on experience, seems to be proven that 
there is almost no trace of the implementation of the case law regarding Article 10 of the 
Convention in Hungarian case law.
In contrast, the Court of Justice EU14 (Luxembourg) examined the questions of human 
rights in connection with the European settlement of the use of the geographical indication 
Tokaji when in a procedure in Italy the Italian administrative court (Lazio) referred the case 
to the Court of Justice EU. Among others the Court was asked to answer the question 
whether the agreement of 1993 between the European Community and Hungary violated 
the Convention, since in consequence of it the wine-growers of the Friul wine region could 
not continue using the indications “Tocai”, “Tocai friuliano”, “Tocai italic” after the 
transitional period of more than 10 years had lapsed. The answer of the Court of Justice EU 
was “not”. In the reasoning it referred to Article 1 of the Protocol I of the Convention, 
according to which the public interest of a State may regulate the use of property right, 
alternatively the practice of the ECHR, according to which the limitation of property is 
legal if the aim is legitimate and the applied means are not disproportionate.
Finally, after the procedure had ended, it also turned out that the journalist was also 
right in fact: the Tokaj Kereskedőház (presumably the new management) admitted that the 
wines had been adulterated for 25 years.15 Therefore the Tokaj Kereskedőház recalled a 
significant amount of its wine from the market, which resulted in a shortage of supply and 
price change for almost a year.
11 Sajó (2005) 156.
12 Sajó (2005) 182.
13 Polgári (2008) 117.
14 C-374/03 para. 118–134.
15 Metropol 5.5.2014, 6; Népszabadság 4.10.2014, 9.
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The judgment is in conformity with the settled case law of the ECHR, we could even 
say with its philosophy, according to which the function of the press is to remain vigilant 
with regard to the functioning of the society, to serve as a public watchdog.
3.2. The Marlboro case
3.2.1. Facts
In No. 6 of 2002 of the French Entrevue magazine an article was published about the 
incredible income of some sportsmen, particularly pointing out Schumacher and Zidane. 
In one of the pictures Schumacher raises a Marlboro cigarette package, in another the same 
trademark can be seen on his safety helmet. Based on the complaint filed by the French 
Committee Against Smoking (C.N.C.T.) at first instance the T.G.I. Paris fined jointly the 
publisher and the chief editor of the magazine by EUR 30,000 in a procedure for prohibited 
advertising. The Court of Appeal added a further EUR 10,000 damages to it and the Cour 
de Cassation refused the request for appeal.
The persons convicted filed a complaint to the ECHR for violation of Article 10 of the 
Convention.
3.2.2. Judgment16
The claimants referred to the fact that the contested photographs were not tobacco 
advertisements, but true pictures about Schumacher as the photo was taken of him after his 
triumph (judgment para 40).
According to the statement of the Court, although the convictions are considered as an 
interference into the freedom of expression, in this case it occurred in the interests of public 
health (judgment para 43).
Protection of public health, for which the laws of both the complained State and the 
European Union provide, can overwrite economic interests, or in a given case even such 
basic rights like the right to freedom of expression (judgment para 46).
The Court states that the national court condemned the claimants for surreptitious 
advertising (publicité indirecte) of tobacco products (judgment para 48).
“The contested photographs do not record a given moment of time but rather a 
stagelike scene behind which the sponsoring company of the sporting event stands [...] The 
claimants could have tarnished the contested logo without risking that the information in 
the article was injured” (judgment para 49).
Considering the aims of health protection, namely the prevention of smoking, the 
measures taken against the freedom of expression are justified and proportionate to these 
legal objectives (judgment para 52).
Finally, the Court remarks that pursuant to the French case law, photographs published 
on sporting events after hours or days do not fall under the exclusive exemption which the 
live sports media enjoys in case of indirect advertising – as it was also mentioned in the 
judgment of the Cour de Cassation (judgment para 64).
Taking all the above into consideration the ECHR stated that Article 10 of the 
Convention had not been violated.
16 26953/05, 5.3.2009. Société de Conception de Presse et d’Edition et Ponson v. France.
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3.2.3. Remarks
The judgment refers not only to the French legal provisions and practice (judgment para 20-
21) but also to the Community law (judgment para 22–23) as well as the documents of the 
Council of Europe (judgment para 24), the World Bank (judgment para 26), as well as the 
framework contract of the World Health Organisation (judgment para 27), i.e. a wide range 
of provisions on the prohibition of advertising tobacco products.
Definitely convincing is the provision taken over resp. cited from the judgment of the 
Cour de Cassation making difference between press and TV advertising. While in live 
sports media advertising of tobacco products is allowed, in the press it is prohibited. In my 
view the obvious reason for the different provisions is that while in case of broadcasting 
sports events the viewers pay attention to the event itself and so the advertisement has a 
secondary role and when the broadcasting stops, it will be forgotten to some extent, but 
press advertising (especially in case of magazines) is persistent and by handing over press 
products to other readers it can make its effect more widely, particularly in case of an 
interesting article.
The reference literature17 mentions this judgment as an example for a measure in favor 
of health protection which also extends to tobacco advertising. Leach18 writes a brief 
summary on the judgment and refers to another judgment of the ECHR (similarly in the 
subject of advertising a tobacco trademark), in which the court refused the complaint as 
well.
3.3. The McDonald’s (I) case19
3.3.1. Facts
London Greenpeace made an anti-McDonald’s campaign: they produced and distributed a 
six page leaflet with the title “What’s wrong with McDonald’s”, each page of which 
comprised the McDonald’s logo. The highly critical leaflet dealt with the following issues: 
“What’s the connection between McDonald’s and starvation in the Third World?”, “Why is 
it wrong for McDonald’s to destroy rainforests?”, “What’s so unhealthy about McDonald’s 
food?”, “How do McDonald’s deliberately exploit children?”, “In what way are McDonald’s 
responsible for torture and murder?”, “What is it like working for McDonald’s?”
Since London Greenpeace was not an incorporated body, McDonald’s hired private 
investigators to find out who was responsible for the leaflet. Subsequently, the US and UK 
McDonald’s started a court procedure against five identified activists for libel. Three of the 
defendants apologised for the leaflet and McDonald’s withdrew proceeding against them so 
the defamation proceeding continued only against Helen Steel and David Morris. The 
former of them worked occasionally and the other was unemployed being responsible for 
the day-to-day care of his four year-old son as a single parent. Both of them were dependent 
on income support.
The High Court found that some statements of the leaflet were true, namely that
– McDonald’s used children to pressurise their parents
17 Karpenstein (2012) 49.
18 Leach (2011) 6.502.
19 The number “I” indicates that only the part of the case will be discussed here which concerns 
freedom of expression, later I return to the case in connection with Article 6 of the Convention.
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– McDonald’s was culpably responsible for cruel practices in the rearing and slaughter 
of some of the animals which are used to produce their food
– McDonald’s (in the UK) pays its workers lower wages than customary and thereby 
it helps to depress professional wages.
However, the High Court found the other allegations and opinions in the leaflet untrue 
and therefore it obliged David Morris to pay each of the two plaintiffs, McDonald’s USA 
and McDonald’s UK GBP 30,000 (altogether GBP 60,000) and Helen Steel to pay each of 
them GBP 27,500 (altogether GBP 55,000) damages. 
The appeal filed by the defendants was rejected, the Court of Appeal only reduced the 
sum of the damages payable to the half and for the rest it said that there was a public 
interest that information about the activities of companies was made available for the public 
and the duty to publish this also applied to the accused campaigners, nevertheless the 
criterion of immunity was that the information should be published in measured tone and 
based on reputable sources. In the instant case the allegations of the leaflet did not seem to 
meet these requirements. The judgment of second instance refused further appeal.
Despite this fact the defendants filed appeal to the House of Lords, which also refused 
the applicants’ leave to appeal. 
After this the defendants turned to the ECHR for violation of Article 6 (right to a fair 
trial) and Article 10 (freedom of expression) of the Convention.
3.3.2. Judgment20
Complainants did not choose to commence defamation proceedings but to protect their 
freedom of expression (judgment para 63).
The Court had to weigh a number of factors in order to establish whether the judgments 
of the British courts had been proportionate to the objected actions. First, the fact is to be 
acknowledged – says the judgment – that the leaflet in question contained very serious 
allegations on topics of general concern, such as abusive farming practices, deforestation, 
exploitation of parents by children advertising, sale of unhealthy food. The court has long 
held that “political expression”, including expression on matters of public interest and 
concern, requires a high level of protection under Article 10 (judgment para 88).
Contrary to the the British government, the Court was of the view that in a democratic 
society even small and informal campaign groups, such as London Greenpeace, must be 
able to carry on their activities effectively, namely to contribute to the public debate by 
disseminating information and ideas on matters of general public interest such as health and 
the environment (judgment para 89).
The Court has held on many occasions that even the press must not overstep certain 
bounds and the same principle had to be applied to others who engaged in public debate. 
Nonetheless, journalists are allowed to recourse to a degree of exaggeration, or even 
provocation. The same applies for a campaigning leaflet, and even it is expected from it 
(judgment para 90).
With regard to the above the judgment concludes that the United Kingdom violated 
Article 10 of the Convention.
20 68416/01, 15. 2. 2005, Steel and Morris v. United Kingdom, Reports 2005-II, 46.
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3.3.3 Remarks
In a democratic society criticism is of fundamental importance.21 Independently from the 
judgment presented here, Rahmatian22 says that in proceedings started for criticism (or 
trademark parody) the national courts are quite careful regarding the human rights aspect 
of cases.
To my knowledge this was the first case when the ECHR considered the freedom of 
publishing critical and hard-hitting opinions enjoyed by journalists admissible in case of a 
campaign group of private persons as well. This sentence of the judgment (judgment para 
90) is cited not only by Hudson23 and Grabenwarter24 but also by J. P. Costa,25 the president 
of the ECHR at that time, in his report held in Helsinki. It is also mentioned by several 
commentators, e.g. by Leach26 or Jacobs, White and Ovey.27
None of the courts can afford to make unilateral judgments, and the ECHR is not an 
exception to that either. This judgment also starts with reference to “the protection of the 
reputation or rights of others” (judgment para 86) and then multinational concerns are 
specified (judgment para 94), i.e. McDonald’s. 
McDonald’s is presumably the greatest fast-food chain of the world: they operate 
almost 35.000 restaurants in 118 countries, the number of their employees is about 440.000. 
As of the 1980s the companies of the holding have been experiencing several similar attacks 
(also in the UK), the American holding wanted to make a deterrent example of the activists 
in order to protect their name and trademark.
The British courts proceeded with indisputable attention, but yet they did not pay 
proper attention to the freedom of expression i.e. to Article 10 of the Convention.
3.4. Intermediary evaluation
Freedom of expression and trademark protection? It is clear that trademarks had just the 
leading position in the above cases and that there are no trademark law issues in the 
judgments. Nevertheless, these still affect trademark property in the following areas:
Protection of the journalist, who protests against dilution of the trademark with drastic 
words (Tokaji).
Protection of the trademark owner’s interest, when he struggles for maintenance of his 
trademark’s reputation (McDonald’s).
A negative example, when a well-known trademark (Marlboro) is subject to 
surreptitious advertising and in the meantime also a third person (owner of the magazine) 
wants to exploit the trademark’s good reputation.
21 Grabenwarter (2014) 46.
22 Rahmatian (2008) 350. Examples from the French court practice: Stop Esso, Camel with 
cigarette in its mouth.
23 Hudson (2005) 301: “[…] strong public interest in enabling such groups and individuals 
outside the mainstream […]”.
24 Grabenwarter (2014) 30.
25 Council of Europe, European Court of Human Rights, 5.6.2008.
26 Leach (2011) 6.466.
27 Rainey (2014) 444.
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4. PROTECTION OF PROPERTY
Protocol I Article 1 of the Convention28 provides for the protection of property. Property is 
one of the oldest legal concepts developed already by Roman Law. The Convention uses 
the expression “possession”. This means not only tangible assets but also intellectual 
property and the ECHR gave several judgments in the areas of copyright,29 patent and 
trademark property. Of the judgments in the latter subject I will discuss the best-known one 
in the following. 
4.1. The Budweiser case30
4.1.1. The Facts
The Anheuser Busch, Inc. has used the trademark Budweiser in the USA since 1876 and 
after about a hundred years they broke into the European market and filed trademark 
applications in several countries, among others in Portugal in 1981.
Here they were confronted with the much older Czech Budweiser sign, which has been 
registered in the international registry of appellations of origin since 1968. 
Despite this fact the Portugal Institute for Industrial Property recorded the Budweiser 
trademark of the American company which was attacked by the owner of the Czech 
appellation of origin Budweiser. The latter based his claim on the Portuguese-Czechoslovak 
Bilateral Agreement on the Protection of Indications of Source, Appellations of Origin 
signed in 1986. The claim was successful, the Portuguese courts, including the Supreme 
Court ordered cancellation of the American company’s trademark based on the Bilateral 
Agreement.
Against this judgment the company Anheuser Busch turned to the ECHR.
4.1.2. Judgment of the Chamber
According to the first instance proceeding at the Chamber, Portugal did not violate Protocol 
I Article 1 of the Convention since it can be applied only to a person’s existing possessions. 
Therefore a prospective right not yet existing, i.e. an application for registration of a 
trademark cannot be regarded as possession. The complainant cannot be sure of being the 
owner of the trademark in question until after its final registration. In the light of this, on 
May 7, 1987, at the time of signing the Bilateral Agreement the complainant had no 
possession which falls within the scope of the Convention. The applicant company filed 
appeal against the judgment to the Grand Chamber.
4.1.3. Judgment of the Grand Chamber31
The Grand Chamber consisting of 17 judges also found that Portugal had not violated 
Protocol I Article 1 of the Convention.
Here I will discuss only those parts of the judgment which contain trademark issues.
28 Text of Protocol I Article 1: “Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful 
enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest 
and subject to the conditions provided for by law and be the general principles of international 
law […]”.
29 Gyenge (2010)
30 The case is discussed in detail by Vida (2014) 87.
31 7830049/01, 11.1.2007. Anheuser Busch v. Portugal.
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a) Trademark application
The legal position of the applicant for registration of a trademark has certain financial 
implications, including those attendant on an assignment (possibly for consideration), or a 
licence, and those arising out of the priority of an application for registration afforded over 
subsequent applications. Nevertheless, the applicant cannot be sure of being the owner of 
the trademark in question until after final registration and then only on condition that no 
objection was raised by a third party, as the relevant legislation permitted. In other words, 
the applicant company had a conditional right, which was extinguished retrospectively for 
failure to satisfy the condition, namely that it did not infringe third-party’s rights (judgment 
para 74).
It should be considered whether the applicant company became the owner of the 
Budweiser mark on June 20, 1995, when the Portugal Institute for Industrial Property issued 
a registration certificate for them, however this circumstance is of secondary importance. 
Namely the issue of the certificate to the applicant company was in breach of the provisions 
of Article 7 of the Code of Industrial Property.32 Thus, these circumstances cannot alter the 
nature of the possession to which the applicant company lays claim or the reality of its 
overall legal position for the purposes of Protocol I Article 1 (judgment para 75).
With this in mind the Court takes due note of the bundle of rights and financial interests 
that arise upon an application for registration of a trademark. The Grand Chamber states 
that such applications may give rise to a variety of legal transactions, such as sale or licence 
agreement which possess or are capable of possessing a substantial financial value. With 
regard to the submission of the Portuguese government that deals in respect of applications 
for the registration of a mark are of negligible or symbolic value the Court notes that in a 
market economy, value depends on a number of factors and it is impossible to assert that 
the assignment of an application for the registration of a trademark will have no financial 
value. In the instant case, as the applicant company pointed out, the mark in question 
possessed a definite financial value on account of its international renown (judgment 
para 76).
These elements taken as a whole suggest that the applicant company’s legal position as 
an applicant for the registration of a trademark came within Protocol I Article 1, as it gave 
rise to interests of a proprietary nature. It is true that the registration of the mark – and the 
greater protection it afforded – would only become final if the mark did not infringe 
legitimate third-party rights. This means, the rights attached to an application for registration 
were conditional. Nevertheless, when it filed its application for registration, the applicant 
company was entitled to expect that it would be examined under the applicable legislation 
if it satisfied the other relevant substantive and procedural conditions. The applicant 
company therefore owned a set of proprietary rights that were recognized under Portuguese 
law. Although these could be revoked under certain conditions, the former fact suffices to 
make Protocol I Article 1 applicable in the instant case further to that the Court examines 
whether the applicant company could claim to have a legitimate expectation (judgment 
para 78).
32 According to Section 7 the certificate of registration must be published after the decision 
becomes final. In case an appeal was filed the prescribed action is to be performed only after the 
court’s decision becomes final.
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b) Whether there has been an interference
According to the applicant company the Lisbon Supreme Court’s judgment of January 23, 
2001 was an interference as it attached a greater weight to the Bilateral Agreement of 1986 
than to the chronologically earlier application for registration of the Budweiser mark. In 
their view that judgment had effectively deprived the applicant company of their right of 
property of the mark in circumstances which, in its submission, infringed the relevant 
international instruments and Protocol I Article 1 for failure to comply with the priority 
rule. Had the Bilateral Agreement not been applied, the applicant company’s application for 
registration would necessarily have been accepted, since it satisfied all the other applicable 
statutory conditions (judgment para 80).
In the light of the above, the question before the Court is whether the decision to apply 
the provisions of the Bilateral Agreement of 1986 to an application for registration filed in 
1981 could amount to interference with the applicant company’s right to the peaceful 
enjoyment of its possessions (judgment para 81).
In the instant case it was not established that the applicant company had right of 
priority in respect of the Budweiser mark when the Bilateral Agreement, which was alleged 
to have been applied retrospectively, came into force. In this connection, the Court points 
out that the only effective registrations in existence when the Bilateral Agreement took 
effect on March 7, 1987 were the appellations of origin that had been registered in 
Budejovickỳ Budvar’s name under the Lisbon Agreement. While it is true that these 
registrations were subsequently canceled, the Court cannot examine what consequences the 
cancellation of the registration had on the right of priority attached to the mark (judgment 
para 84).
These are questions whose rightful place was before the domestic courts. The 
Portuguese Supreme Court decided in its judgment of January 23, 2001 to reject the 
applicant company’s argument based on an alleged violation of the priority rule. In the 
absence of any arbitrariness or manifest unreasonableness, the Court cannot call into 
question the findings of the Supreme Court on this point (judgment para 85).
In the light of the foregoing, the Court therefore concludes that the Portuguese 
Supreme Court’s judgment deciding the legal dispute did not constitute interference with 
the applicant company’s right to the peaceful enjoyment of its possessions. There has, 
therefore, been no violation of Protocol I Article 1 (judgment para 87).
4.1.3. Remarks
Beiter33 from South-Africa states of the judgment that it has three main messages. These are 
a) the connection between the trademark and the appellation of origin, b) the application of 
Protocol I for intellectual property, c) the resolution of the given case.
About the connection between the trademark and the appellation of origin he explains 
that the view appearing in the judgment that the application for registration of a trademark 
is overridden by the Bilateral Agreement, is in conformity with the decision34 of the Dispute 
Settlement Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO) as well, which in the cited case, 
subject of which was also the collision between an appellation of origin and a trademark, 
decided in favor of the former one.
33 Beiter (2008) 724.
34 WT/DS147/R, decision of 15. 3. 2005.
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He says that it is questionable whether trademarks should be granted protection under 
human rights law. In his view it can be contested whether in addition to scientific, literary 
or artistic property, human rights protection can be extended to trademarks as well.
In his view, resulting from the decision of the Portuguese Supreme Court, there had 
been an unlawful expropriation of property and the ECHR should rather have analysed this 
issue.
It would be inappropriate to consider Helfer’s35 extensive writing as a commentary, 
which reviews the ECHR judgments on the subject of intellectual property, but he puts the 
emphasis on the judgment made in the Budweiser case. Although he notes as a preliminary 
point that the above discussed proceeding can just be regarded as a little skirmish in the 
extended litigation war, which lead to about fifty court procedures between the American 
and Czech companies in the past quarter of the century; despite this evaluation he analyses 
the case quite thoroughly.
He examines in particular how the Court coped with the question of State interference 
(i.e. with the judgments of the Portuguese courts). Concerning this issue he is of the opinion 
that due to the prohibition to apply a legal provision with retroactive effect, the request of 
the American complainant was well-grounded. The situation is different in case of the 
review of the domestic court judgments. In this respect the Court always made a review 
only in very limited circumstances (in absence of any arbitrariness or manifest 
unreasonableness).
Following this, based on the lessons learnt from the Budweiser judgment, however 
cutting oneself adrift from it, he makes a prognosis. He shares namely his thoughts thereon, 
what kind of judgments concerning intellectual property cases can be expected in 
Strasbourg. In this respect he sets up three paradigms: a) the rule of law paradigm; b) the 
enforcement paradigm; c) the balancing paradigm.
a) About the rule of law paradigm he says that it can be stated both from the judgment 
rendered in the Budweiser case and from the case law referred to therein that in review of 
the decisions of domestic courts and authorities the ECHR limits his role to cases which 
can be considered as arbitrary or unreasonable, and this also applies to judgments which 
cover the subject of intellectual property. To support his prognosis, he mentions two 
examples: the Balani vs. Spain case, in which the Spanish Supreme Court disregarded the 
priority of the trademark owner and on request of the competitor the trademark was 
canceled. The other is: the unreasonable length of the procedure, e.g. in a patent infringement 
case in Slovenia no judgment was passed for 11 years.
b) He interprets the enforcement paradigm as the “positive obligations” of the States, 
namely that they are obliged to protect private property. In respect of intellectual property 
this means that a fresh set of complaints should be generated, or with the wording of TRIPS 
“fair and equitable” procedures.
c) In his view, the Court’s adoption of an intellectual property balancing paradigm 
would have negative consequences for innovation and creative law and policy. He believes 
that the judgment in the Budweiser case suggests that retroactive laws that deprive 
intellectual property owners of an existing asset, may violate Protocol I Article 1. The 
retroactive legal actions of the States can namely upset investment expectations calculated 
based on the preceding legal situation. Therefore, such measures should be examined in 
light of article 13 of the TRIPS (limitations and exceptions).
35 WT/DS147/R, decision of 15. 3. 2005.
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In his comprehensive but more concise study the German Sebastian36 reports on more 
human rights judgments rendered in intellectual property subject and considers that among 
these the Budweiser, i.e. Anheuser Busch case is the most important.
An important message of the judgment is – he believes – that the main function of the 
ECHR is the control of the States’ measures, among others the control of their court ruling, 
however in this case its right is limited to the control of arbitrary and unreasonable 
judgments.
From the rulings of the judgments considered to be important by him he highlights the 
following:
– the applied legal interpretation is autonomous, i.e. it is based on the text of the 
Convention (para 62, 63),
– the provisions of the Convention on the protection of property can also be extended 
to assets, pursuant to intellectual property (para 62, 65, 69, 71, 72, 75, 78, 79, 83),
– a trademark application can be granted protection based on the Convention (para 78),
– to the latter it is sufficient if the trademark application can be the subject of the 
business (para 76).
Besides the two commentaries disclosed here all Handbooks on the Convention 
mention this judgment in at least one sentence when discussing Protocol I Article 1.
In respect of trademark law, I believe, at first the statements of the judgment in 
connection with the legal assessment of the trademark application (judgment para 74, 78) 
must be mentioned.
In this regard the consistent standpoint of both the proceeding Chamber and Grand 
Chamber is that a trademark application creates a pending legal situation. This situation can 
be changed into a defendable legal situation on two conditions: firstly, if following the 
formal and substantive examination the authority for industrial property considers the sign 
to be capable of protection, secondly, if no third person files an objection against it based on 
his earlier rights.
The question is, what the situation would be if the application was not filed for a 
reputed mark but for a plain trademark application? In this respect presumably the 
circumstances of the case (creativity, authenticity) may be decisive.
4. 2. Intermediary evaluation
Property is the only right of economical value which is protected by the Convention besides 
political and civil rights. Protocol I Article 1 unequivocally covers intellectual property, and 
so trademark property, too. Among trademark property cases the Budweiser case is the most 
significant.37
Concerning trademarks, also the question arises what the situation with goodwill is, 
namely with the goodwill of a trademark. Can the goodwill of a trademark be separated 
from the trademark itself, or not? More specifically, can the trademark be separated from its 
customers,38 or not?
36 Sebastian (2013) 524.
37 For example the complaint for interference into property right (including trademarks) is 
considered to be inappropriate as by refusing the approval of the assignment the same becomes 
redundant also in respect of trademarks.
38 About loyal customers being a goodwill cf. Karpenstein (2012) 22.
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In my view, the goodwill of a trademark is in close connection with the trademark 
itself, that it can hardly be separated from it. Nevertheless, in case of a state interference 
(seizure, expropriation, etc.), the goodwill and the trademark (in itself) are subjects to a 
separate evaluation. 
5. RIGHT TO FAIR TRIAL
From practical, legal and symbolic aspects Article 6 of the Convention39 is of fundamental 
significance. This provision is influenced by the principle of “due process of law” in Anglo-
American law.40 In the reference literature the dominant opinion appears that this is the 
most important provision of the Convention. This provision reflects the European 
constitutional principle of the rule of law.
At the same time, it was pleasing for me that I could reveal solely one judgment 
declaring a violation of Article 6 of the Convention in the trademark subject i.e. concerning 
human rights. Although in the other case the leading role has a trademark, the legal issue 
does not concern trademark law.
5.1. The Orient case
5.1.1. Facts
The Japanese company Orient Watch Co., whose mark had been protected since 1950, filed 
a request for cancellation against the trademark Orient H.W. Balani Malaga in Spain. Both 
parties use their trademark for watches. The Madrid First-Instance Court refused the request 
for cancellation action among others on the reason that the owner of the contested trademark 
had a prior mark Creations Orient, which had been registered in 1934.
The Japanese company appealed to the Supreme Court, which held that the contested 
trademark was not valid (not “established”). However, it made no reference to the earlier 
mark Creations Orient in its judgment.
The owner of the Spanish trademark which was removed from the register filed a 
complaint to the ECHR for violation of Article 6 of the Convention.
5.1.2. Judgment41
Article 6 of the Convention obliges the courts to give reasons to their judgments. However, 
this cannot be understood as requiring a detailed answer to every submission filed by the 
parties. The question whether a court has failed to fulfill the obligation to state reasons, 
deriving from Article 6 of the Convention, can only be determined in the light of the 
circumstances of the case (judgment para 27).
39 Text of Article 6: “1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal 
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the 
press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or 
national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the 
private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in 
special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice [...]”.
40 Grabenwarter (2014) 6.1.
41 18064/91, 9. 12. 1994. Hiro Balani v. Spain.
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In the instant case the applicant contested the action for removal of her trademark from 
the register, inter alia, on the basis that the Spanish Supreme Court ignored her submission 
based on the priority of another mark that she owned. This submission was sufficiently 
proved in the first-instance court proceeding. The Supreme Court, which gave a different 
judgment, was bound to review all the submissions made during the proceedings, or at least 
the subject of argument. It is not the task of the Court to examine whether the submission 
based on the priority ratione temporis of Creations Orient was well-grounded; it falls to the 
national courts to determine questions of that nature.
It is necessary to establish whether the silence of the Supreme Court on this question 
can be reasonably construed as an implied rejection, i.e. whether the prior trademark 
Creations Orient has priority over the company mark Orient Watch Co. This is a matter of 
law and logic. Further, it should also be established whether the company mark Orient Watch 
Co. collides with the company mark Creations Orient. The first question requires a specific 
and express reply. In the absence of such a reply, it is impossible to ascertain whether the 
Spanish Supreme Court simply neglected to deal with the submission based on the prior 
right or whether it intended to dismiss it and, if so, what its reasons were for so deciding.
Based on the above the ECHR stated that the Spanish Supreme Court had violated 
Article 6 of the Convention (judgment para 28) and obliged the State of Spain to reimburse 
the costs and expenses of the procedure for the applicant (judgment para 31).
5.1.3. Remarks
It is difficult to disagree with the judgment of the ECHR. In essence the withdrawal of a 
right existing for 25 years was at stake before the national court, which was even supported 
by an older right (from 1934).
It cannot be established from the judgment of the ECHR which aspects the Spanish 
Supreme Court took into consideration when it stated the invalidity of the trademark Orient 
H.W. Balani Malaga. In accordance with its settled case law the ECHR did not examine the 
merit of the case, and it was satisfied with establishing the fact that the judgment of the 
Spanish Supreme Court was incomplete.
Also in accordance with its settled case law the ECHR said finally that it is the duty of 
the national court to decide on the merit of the case (like the Court of Justice EU in the 
reference cases). The basis of this consistent case law is that Article 6 of the Convention 
applies to the proceeding and not to its outcome or result.
It would be interesting to know the subsequent case-history: how the Spanish Supreme 
Court decided. Was the result an in integrum restitution of the mark Orient?
5.2. The McDonald’s (II) case
5.2.1. Facts
This case has already been discussed from the aspect of substantive law (freedom of 
expression), but I believe it is more interesting from the aspect of procedural law.
Before the trial started there were 28 pre-trial hearings, some lasting up to five days. 
The trial lasted for 313 days (for two and a half years), this was the longest trial ever in the 
English legal history (civil or criminal). The transcripts of the trial occupied 20.000 pages, 
the documentary evidence ran to about 40.000 pages and 130 witnesses gave oral evidence. 
The first-instance judgment consists of 762 pages.
In the first-instance case the defendants requested the court to grant legal aid. But 
defamation was expressly excluded from legal aid regime by the effective legal act (Legal 
246 VIDA, SÁNDOR
Aids Act 1988). At the same time the restaurant chain McDonald’s was represented by 
solicitors being experts in defamation cases. At some hearings the defendants were assisted 
by solicitors acting pro bono, however for the bulk of the trial they acted alone.
In addition, the defendants were unable to pay for the transcripts of the proceedings 
(which would have cost GBP 375 per day), and finally after some weeks could buy the 
transcripts at reduced costs (for GBP 25 per day), so they purchased these from donations. 
Therefore, in the procedure they referred to the fact that they could not prepare with 
questions to the witnesses and experts.
In their appeal the defendants also referred to the fact that given the complicated 
procedure the plaintiffs were financially strong while they were representing themselves 
under difficult circumstances and this situation caused an abuse of the judiciary service. 
The Court of Appeal rejected these submissions. It stated that the judge of the first-instance 
procedure had been impartial and objective and the defendants had conducted their case 
forcefully and with persistence.
Since the defendants did not agree with these statements, they filed their complaint 
based also on violation of Article 6 of the Convention.
5.2.2. Judgment42
The right to fair trial means among others that the parties enjoy equality of arms before the 
court (judgment para 59).
The question whether the provision of legal aid is necessary for a fair hearing must be 
determined on the basis of the particular facts and circumstances of each case and will 
depend, inter alia, upon the complexity of the relevant law and procedure, the importance of 
what is at stake for the applicant in the proceedings, the applicant’s capacity to represent 
him or herself effectively (judgment para 61).
The defamation procedure was not initiated by the claimants. Moreover, as a 
consequence of their financial situation they failed to understand and reply to all the 
questions arisen in the procedure (judgment para 63). 
Besides the complexity of the case the length of the judgments of the courts was 
extraordinary, too. In addition, a number of experts took part in the procedure dealing with 
questions such as nutrition, degenerative disease and food safety. The length of the first- 
and second-instance judgments exceed 1.100 pages and the facts were also complicated 
(judgment para 65).
Nor were the legal issues simple, including the meanings to be attributed to the words 
of the leaflet, the question whether the applicants were responsible for its publication, the 
distinction between fact and comment, the admissibility of evidence (judgment para 66).
Despite the fact that they received some legal help from time to time, e.g. their initial 
pleadings were legally drafted and they were assisted by barristers and solicitors on some 
hearings, for the bulk of the proceedings they acted alone (judgment para 68).
The denial of legal aid contributed to an unacceptable inequality of arms and therefore 
Section 1 of Article 6 of the Convention was violated (judgment para 72).
With respect to the above circumstances the judgment condemned Great-Britain to pay 
EUR 20.000 to the first applicant and EUR 15.000 for the second applicant as compensation 
for non-pecuniary damage, and further EUR 47.311 altogether for both of them as 
reimbursement of costs and expenses.
42 68416/01 15.2.2005., Steel and Morris v. United Kingdom; Reports 2005-II.
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5.2.3. Remarks
The contrast between a claimant and a defendant could not be greater. In the procedure the 
basic problem was that British law did not allow the granting of legal aid for the defendants 
ex officio in defamation cases. This caused an inequality of arms. It is worth noting that 
during the procedure discussed here the British legislator updated the relevant law (Access 
to Justice Act 1999) which sets up the exception [Sec. 8 (8)] that the State can take over the 
costs of legal aid on decision of the Lord Chancellor. Therefore, today in a similar case the 
defendants would have more chance in obtaining legal aid.
It is a matter of fact that at the time of the procedure the governing British law did not 
allow this, however the ECHR has the right to disregard such an unfavorable provision and 
it made its decision accordingly.
A British journalist, Oliver43 gave his article the title “David versus Goliath”, in which 
he speculates what the motivation of the two tenacious opponents of McDonald’s could 
have been to unremittingly fight for their truth for ten years. One reason, he thinks, was 
anger that the existing law denied legal aid in such cases. The other reason was the endeavor 
to open up the way for other campaigners and enable them to take action against big 
corporations with almost immeasurable excessive financial advantage without similar 
ordeals.
According to Hudson44 the most important result and consequence of the judgment 
of the ECHR for English law is that it opens the possibility to grant legal aid also in 
defamation cases. In his view this was envisaged by the Lord Chancellor when he was 
asked for the Government’s response to the decision in the House of Lords. Thus, a serious 
step was taken in favor of the fortuneless defendants to be able to defend them efficiently in 
such cases.
A further effect of the judgment upon the English court practice is that in the future in 
defamation cases, in assessing the size of the award or damages having been extremely high 
value up to that time, also the financial situation of the defendant will be considered in case 
the defendant can suitably prove to be of limited means – says Hudson.45
The length of the procedure lasting for almost ten years and its costs indicate how high 
its own reputation, trademark and image is evaluated by the McDonald’s holding, since the 
fee of lawyers alone was about 10 million GBP46 and there is no data what the cost of the 
private investigators’ three-year work prior to that could have been.
6. SUMMARY
The purpose of the present paper was legal fact-finding without any special theoretic 
commentary. The result shows that trademark property only rarely meets human rights.
If the two areas of law: human rights and the law of trademarks meet after all, it can be 
considered to be an exception. Thus, such cases are unlikely to constitute a bar to the 
ordinary application of rules or practices of the trademark law of the States being parties to 
the Convention.
43 Oliver (2005)
44 Hudson (2005) 301.
45 Hudson (2005) 301.
46 Lillard (2005) 895.
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